Homepage. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez. Ph.D. Candidate in Social Science (Economics). California Institute of Technology.

Market Design. Matching markets. Mechanism Design. Microeconomic Theory. 




Welcome to my website. I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Social Science (Economics) at the California Institute of Technology. I am interested in mechanism design with applications to matching and political economy.

You can find my CV here.

job Market Paper:

"Deferred Acceptance and Regret-Free Truthtelling: A Characterization Result." [PDF]

Working papers:

"Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," joint with L. Yariv. [PDF]

"Implications of Overconfidence on Information Investment," joint with T. Mayskaya. [PDF@SSRN]

work in progress:

"Stable Matching Correspondence is Implementable in Obviously Dominant Strategies for Men."

"Many-to-One Stable Matching via Linear Programming," joint with A. Neme, P. Neme, and J. Oviedo.